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INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION:
A FIDUCIARY THEORY
M.E. Newhouse*
Dennis F. Thompson developed a theory of “institutional corrup-
tion” in order to explain a phenomenon that he believed the Congres-
sional ethics rules failed to address: Congress’ systematic deviation from
its proper purpose as a consequence—not merely of individual wrongdo-
ing—but of the influence of several general systemic features of the legis-
lative process. Researchers at Harvard University’s Edmond J. Safra
Center for Ethics have recently deployed the language of institutional
corruption broadly in analyses of various other public and private insti-
tutions, such as regulatory agencies, banks, pharmaceutical companies,
and think tanks.  The states of affairs that researchers have identified as
“institutional corruption” fall into four categories: 1) breaches of fiduci-
ary duty, 2) fraud or otherwise unfair commercial practices, 3) destruc-
tive firm behavior, and 4) mistake, inefficiency, or incompetence.  This
Article reveals that only the first of these represents a true application of
Dennis F. Thompson’s theory of institutional corruption, which was
originally developed in the context of Congressional ethics.  Research
projects that deploy the terminology of institutional corruption in non-
fiduciary contexts are certainly valuable, but they do not address the
subject matter of institutional corruption, properly understood.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Dennis F. Thompson coined the term “institutional corrup-
tion” to explain a phenomenon that he believed the Congressional ethics
rules failed to address: Congress’ systematic deviation from its proper
purpose as a consequence—not merely of individual wrongdoing—but
of the influence of several general systemic features of the legislative
process.1  Lawrence Lessig recently embraced a version of Thompson’s
institutional corruption theory, presenting his own conception of institu-
tional corruption applicable to Congress in the context of a call for cam-
paign finance reform.2  While Thompson’s theory focuses on systemic
influences inside of Congress,3 Lessig’s account focuses on the systemic
effect that Congress’ dependency on campaign donations has on its legis-
lative activities.4  Lessig also offers a somewhat different specification of
the public purpose from which he argues that Congress has deviated.5
Although Lessig’s own institutional corruption research focuses on
Congress, he aspires to promote the use of institutional corruption the-
ory’s distinctive analytical framework in non-governmental contexts as
well.  Lessig has summarized the basic components of the institutional
corruption framework thus:
An economy of influence that weakens the effectiveness
of an institution, especially by weakening public trust of
that institution.6
The concept of an institutional purpose is not explicitly mentioned
in this formulation, but its role in institutional corruption theory is im-
plied by the stipulation that the economy of influence in a corrupt institu-
tion “weakens [its] effectiveness.”  In order to determine whether or not
1 See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL
CORRUPTION (1995).
2 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CON-
GRESS—-AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011).
3 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 8.
4 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 125–71.
5 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Institutional Corruptions (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For
Ethics, Working Papers No. 1, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2233582 (comparing his conception of institutional corruption to Thompson’s
conception).
6 Memorandum, Lawrence Lessig, Request for Proposals for the Lab “Project on Insti-
tutional Corruption,” Harvard University 3 (Nov. 12, 2010) (on file with author).
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an institution’s effectiveness has been weakened, we must have some
baseline—an “institutional purpose”—according to which we can assess
institutional performance.  Lessig therefore considers the identification
of an institutional purpose to be a basic “assumption” of any institutional
corruption analysis.7  He writes, “Institutions have purposes.  We can
measure the success of these institutions by how well they serve these
purposes.  Success can be measured by the output of the institution.”8
Recently, researchers at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics have
begun producing literature that deploys the terminology of institutional
corruption broadly in analyses of various public and private institutions.
This growing body of work illustrates the theoretical challenge that re-
searchers must meet in order to effectively broaden the reach of institu-
tional corruption theory.  In each new context, a researcher must identify
the institutional purpose to which the theory properly applies.
This challenge is both more complex and more important than is
immediately apparent.  Thompson’s and Lessig’s accounts of institu-
tional corruption in the context of Congress share a common feature that
many plausible private sector analogs do not: an obligatory purpose.  Po-
litical theorists may disagree about what specifically constitutes the
proper purpose of the state, but they generally agree that the state has a
proper purpose, for which alone the exercise of state authority is justi-
fied.9  When state actors coerce us merely to enrich themselves or their
friends, they abuse their power and weaken the effectiveness with which
the state achieves its proper purpose.  Thus, in the context of legislative
ethics, we at least know the general nature of the “institutional purpose”
we are seeking.
But private organizations are not states.  Because private organiza-
tions usually do not coerce us, they are not generally obligated to act for
the state’s public purpose.  Moreover, it is not obvious that all private
organizations have an obligatory purpose of any sort.  Intuitively, we
tend to think that many private organizations may permissibly adopt or
discard all kinds of different purposes.  The question of how institutional
corruption theorists ought to determine the purpose of private institutions
in the course of institutional corruption analyses is therefore critical for
those who would apply the theory outside of its original context.
7 Id. at 1.
8 Id.
9 David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REV.
2348, 2350 (1992) (“In its classical form, the key idea of natural law is that legal systems are
legitimately instituted in order to promote the common good.”); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians
as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 719 (2013) (“Even if opinions differ regarding
whether representatives should be acting in the general public interest or in the interests of
their specific constituents, people are likely to agree that representatives should not be acting
primarily in their own interests.”).
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This Article points the way toward a coherent theory of institutional
corruption applicable to some private sector institutions.  Part I analyzes
Thompson’s and Lessig’s original accounts of institutional corruption in
the context of Congress, develops a model of institutional corruption ap-
plicable to both accounts, and describes in detail the challenges raised by
the application of institutional corruption theory to other institutions.
Part II reviews the recent literature deploying the terminology of institu-
tional corruption in various private sector contexts and identifies four
distinct categories of institutions—Fiduciaries, Frauds, Fiends, and
Fools—that researchers have identified as institutionally corrupt.  Part III
develops a generalized institutional corruption model that reveals institu-
tional corruption theory to be a theory of organizational fiduciary duty
and breach.  Properly understood, institutional corruption theory is appli-
cable only to Fiduciaries—public and private sector institutions that have
a fiduciary obligation to act solely for the purposes of a principal or prin-
cipals.  While research projects that focus on the categories dubbed
Frauds, Fiends, and Fools are certainly valuable, they do not address the
subject matter of institutional corruption.
I. INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION: PAST AND PRESENT
To understand and evaluate current efforts to apply institutional cor-
ruption theory more broadly, it helps to begin at the beginning.  Thomp-
son developed institutional corruption theory while studying
Congressional ethics in the 1990s, and Lessig used a slightly modified
version of Thompson’s theory as the basis of his argument in favor of
federal campaign finance reform.  What follows is a description of this
early work, a model of institutional corruption called the Thompson-Les-
sig Model, and a description of the challenges faced by researchers who
propose to apply the theory in new institutional contexts.
A. The Origin of Institutional Corruption Theory
Institutional corruption theory first appeared in the context of legis-
lative ethics.10  Dennis Thompson developed the theory in order to ac-
count for the ways in which institutional corruption differs from
individual corruption.  Institutional corruption does not necessarily in-
volve individuals who engage in illegal or unethical conduct.11  Instead,
“institutional corruption” in the context of legislative ethics refers to
states of affairs in which political benefits—such as campaign contribu-
tions, endorsements, organizational support, or media exposure—are
10 See generally THOMPSON, supra note 1.
11 Id. at 25 (“Members who act not for personal gain but out of mixed, even noble,
motives may still be the agents of a most serious corruption.”).
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made available to lawmakers under conditions that, in general, tend to
promote private interests at the expense of the legislature’s public
purpose.12
Of course, people reasonably disagree about the content of the con-
cept of “public purpose”—a purpose for which the state’s exercise of
coercive authority is justified.13  Thompson’s own account of institu-
tional corruption therefore includes a substantive claim about what
makes it the case that lawmakers act for a public purpose: lawmakers
must act in a way that is consistent with principles of deliberative democ-
racy.14  He writes:
Members of the legislature seek agreement while expect-
ing that disagreement will persist.  The challenge for leg-
islative ethics is to devise rules that will help legislators
make good and just policy even while they continue to
disagree about what that is.  Under these circumstances
the best hope is to encourage a process that is justifiable
from as many moral perspectives as possible.15
The process that Thompson argues is widely justifiable, and there-
fore legitimating, should ensure that lawmakers legislate on the basis of a
sincere exchange of what John Rawls called “public reasons.”16  Thomp-
son concludes that a legislature acts for a public purpose only insofar as
it follows this decision-making procedure: “In a deliberative process,
members consider policies on their merits, treat citizens and colleagues
fairly, and publicly account for their actions.”17
Thompson doesn’t deem a legislature corrupt simply because its
members vote on the basis of honest mistakes about the nature of justice
or the limits of state power.  However, he does stipulate that a legislature
is institutionally corrupt if it is subject to “patterns of political influence”
that are “clearly irrelevant to any process of deliberation.”18  Political
gains associated with catering to such influences are “improper.”19
Lawmakers are “independent” of improper influences so long as they
consider policies on their “merits,” or whatever lawmakers reasonably
understand to be those merits.
12 See id. at 30–31; see also Lessig, supra note 5, at 5.
13 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 18 (“In a pluralist society, citizens do not always agree on
what is good or just legislation.”).
14 Lessig, supra note 5, at 8–9.
15 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 18 (emphasis added).
16 See generally Dennis F. Thompson, Public Reason and Precluded Reasons, 72 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2073 (2003).
17 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 20.
18 Id. at 20–21. See also Thompson, supra note 16 (2003).
19 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 25.
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Lawrence Lessig recently adopted Thompson’s institutional corrup-
tion theory in order to develop his own account of institutional corrup-
tion in the U.S. Congress.  As a starting point, Lessig echoes
Thompson’s observation that in the context of political decision-making,
“independence” doesn’t usually refer to choices made at random.
Rather, a public official acts independently if her actions depend on the
proper considerations—”independence,” Lessig concludes, is better de-
scribed as “the proper dependence.”20  Lessig uses the term “dependence
corruption” to refer to the state of an institution that deviates from its
proper dependency due to an improper dependency.  A competing depen-
dency is thus one kind of influence that can give rise to institutional
corruption.
For Thompson, Lessig explains, legislative deliberations are inde-
pendent if they depend on the “merits” of the relevant public policy ques-
tions.21  Just as Thompson’s account of institutional corruption in
Congress reflects his commitment to a deliberative process, Lessig’s ac-
count reflects his commitment to a representational standard of demo-
cratic legitimacy, for which he makes an originalist constitutional
argument.  Lessig argues that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution in-
tended for the House of Representatives to be “dependent upon the Peo-
ple alone.”22  Like Thompson, Lessig does not consider politicians’
honest mistakes about the nature of the public interest to be evidence of
institutional corruption, so long as they are responsive to the voters they
represent.
In modern times, Lessig argues, Congressional candidates cannot in
fact be elected without substantial support from the small minority of
Americans who fund political campaigns (“the funders”).  Lessig con-
cludes that this de facto requirement makes politicians effectively depen-
dent on the funders—a dependency that corrupts Congress by causing it
to deviate from its proper dependency “upon the People alone.”  To those
who object that funders are people, too, 23 Lessig responds that the
funders’ collective possession of an effective veto is nonetheless objec-
tionable according to any reasonable interpretation of the Framers’ intent
as expressed by James Madison, because “there is no plausible theory
under which [the funders] are ‘representative’ of ‘the People.’  Not dem-
ographically, not ideologically, not experientially, not at all.”24
20 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 131.
21 Lessig, supra note 5, at 8–9.
22 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 128 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison)).
23 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Is “Dependence Corruption” Distinct from a Political
Equality Argument for Campaign Finance Laws?A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELECTION
L.J. 305, 310 (2013).
24 Lessig, supra note 5, at 17.  Hasen responds to Lessig’s argument by examining the
context of James Madison’s exhortation, which indicates that Madison was referring to the
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Lessig appears to think that a Congress that properly represents the
people will legislate in a manner consistent with the public’s expressed
policy preferences.  He writes that our government can be deemed cor-
rupt insofar as it “doesn’t track the expressed will of the people, whether
on the Left or on the Right.”25  He also cites Martin Gilens’ research
establishing the existence of “a wide gap in the policy preferences of ‘the
funders’ and ‘the People,’ [and that] in the face of that gap, Congress
tracks not ‘the people’ but ‘the funders.’”26  In Lessig’s view, this gap is
evidence that Congress has deviated from its proper purpose due to its
dependence on the funders.  A second way in which Congress deviates
from its institutional purpose, Lessig writes, is by prioritizing issues
about which the funders care deeply at the expense of issues about which
a majority of the American people care deeply.27
Thompson and Lessig have two different conceptions28 of “public
purpose”—different specifications of a shared parent concept—which
function as Congress’ institutional purpose in their respective analyses.
Some states of affairs will count as “institutional corruption” according
to both conceptions, but other states of affairs are “institutional corrup-
tion” under one conception but not the other.
B. A Model of Institutional Corruption
Although Thompson and Lessig specify Congress’ “public purpose”
somewhat differently, their accounts are different specifications of the
importance of making the House of Representatives independent of the state governments. See
Hasen, supra note 23,  at 314–15.  Hasen concludes that the specific way in which the Framers
intended the House of Representatives to be “dependent on the people alone” was that it be
independent of state governments. Id.  Insofar as both the funders and the people writ large
are independent of state governments, the funders would—in this narrow but perhaps suffi-
cient sense—be representative of the people.
25 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 8.
26 Id. at 151–52.
27 Id. at 151.
28 The similarities and differences between Thompson’s and Lessig’s accounts of “insti-
tutional corruption” in Congress illustrate a classic distinction—drawn by philosophers such as
John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and W.B. Gallie— between a “concept” and its various “con-
ceptions.” See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 3, 3–32
(1955); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134–36 (1977); W. B. Gallie, Art as
an Essentially Contested Concept, 6 THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 97 (1956).  Following
Mark Criley, a concept can be conceived of as a cluster of one or more norms (i.e. rules) that
limit the particular objects or states of affairs that count as instances of that concept. See Mark
Edward Criley, Contested Concepts and Competing Conceptions (2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Pittsburgh).  In many cases, a concept is “underspecified,” meaning
that its limiting conditions are not sufficient to identify, even in principle, a distinct category of
instances that fall under the concept. Id.  Such a concept, “public purpose” in this case, may
give rise to competing “conceptions,” understood as further specifications of the concept in
question that are consistent with the parameters of the original underspecified concept, but
which identify a non-contradictory subset of the possible claims that fall under the original
concept. Id.
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same theory of institutional corruption, understood as the shared concep-
tual framework that they apply in the course of their analyses.  This
framework is depicted here as the Thompson-Lessig Model.  See Figure
1.
Legislative
Authority
(belongs to
the public)
in order to
advance
Public
Purposes
institutional tendency
(proxy measure of IC) Private
Purposes
Discretionary
ControlCongress
FIGURE 1: THE THOMPSON-LESSIG MODEL
Lessig and Thompson agree that Congress’ legislative authority
does not rightfully belong to its members.  Like all of the U.S. govern-
ment’s legitimate powers, the legislative authority belongs in the first
instance to the people of the United States, who have delegated this au-
thority to Congress on the condition that it will be exercised solely for
public purposes.29  The Constitution affords Congress significant discre-
tion to make laws for public purposes, but if the members of Congress
legislate for private purposes, they abuse the public resource—the legis-
lative authority—over which they have been given conditional
stewardship.
Thompson and Lessig agree that Congress is institutionally corrupt,
but the process of actually identifying and measuring its institutional cor-
ruption is complicated by the fact that lawmakers’ honest mistakes are
not evidence of institutional corruption.  Mere failure to achieve some
well-defined ideal, therefore, is not proof that Congress is corrupt.30
Thompson explains, “[T]he purposes of government (and many other
public institutions) are multiple and contestable, and therefore cannot be
fully specified and endorsed independently of a legitimate collective de-
cision making process.”31  Thompson and Lessig therefore identify insti-
tutional corruption through a proxy: the extent to which Congress
29 See U.S. CONST. art. I.
30 See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 328 n.6 (“[T]he term dependence corruption describes the
process of governance.  It doesn’t point to a particular tainted result.”); Hasen, supra note 23,
at 309 (“Distortion of policy is an effect of dependence corruption and not the ‘pathology’
itself.”)
31 Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption 1, 5 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for
Ethics, Working Paper No. 16,  2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2304419.
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systematically advances purposes that cannot plausibly be considered
public.  The Thompson-Lessig Model depicts this phenomenon as a
dashed line reflecting an “institutional tendency” to advance private pur-
poses.32  Because public purposes are understood to be the outcomes of
democratic processes, systematic influences that corrupt Congress do so
by undermining “legitimate institutional procedures.”33
Thompson assesses the degree to which Congress has deviated from
its proper purpose primarily by examining inputs.  Excessive time spent
on individual constituent service, for example, may undermine Congress’
ability to advance public purposes through legislation.34  Lessig attempts
to measure the extent of institutional corruption in Congress both in
terms of inputs, such as the percentage of time spent advancing private
priorities that differ from public priorities, and in terms of outputs, such
as the extent to which legislative outcomes reflect private preferences
that differ from public preferences.35
The basic structure of the Thompson-Lessig Model could be used to
describe individual as well as institutional corruption in the context of
Congress, although some of the component concepts in the individual
and institutional models would differ.  The differences between individ-
ual and institutional corruption are: (1) the nature of the incentives that
cause the institution to deviate from its purpose, and (2) whether the
deviation is the result of individual choice or institutional tendency.
Whereas private gain motivates perpetrators of individual corruption, in-
stitutional corruption is the unintended by-product of legitimate incen-
tives such as positive media attention, legal campaign contributions, and
ultimately electoral success.36  Whereas individual corruption consists of
individuals’ choices to violate their duty to act solely on the public’s
behalf, institutional corruption is the institution’s failure to act on the
public’s behalf due to its dysfunctional incentive structures.37  Congress
may in principle be institutionally corrupt even if no lawmaker is indi-
vidually corrupt, but lawmakers are morally accountable for any failure
to combat institutional corruption.38
32 See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 31.
33 Thompson, supra note 31, at 4–5.
34 See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 84–85
35 Lessig identifies these two kinds of deviation as “substantive distortion” and “agenda
distortion.” LESSIG, supra note 2, at 151.
36 See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 30 (“Political gain involves goods that are usable
primarily in the political process and are necessary for doing a job or are essential by-products
of doing it.”).
37 Id. at 31 (“In individual corruption, the link between the gain and the service is an
individual motive in the mind of the legislator. . . . In institutional corruption, the link is an
institutional tendency.”).
38 See Thompson, supra note 31, at 8 (“It is important to notice that a charge of institu-
tional corruption does not mean that only the institution is at fault.  (This is a common misap-
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C. The Challenge
Although Thompson developed his theory in the context of legisla-
tive ethics, he believes that it can be applied more broadly.  In Ethics in
Congress, Thompson suggested, “[T]he approach to legislative ethics de-
veloped here applies to corruption in many different kinds of institu-
tions.”39  Thompson recently reaffirmed, “[T]he basic [institutional
corruption] framework and much of the analysis can be applied to [pri-
vate] institutions.”40  Lessig’s own institutional corruption writings have
likewise focused on Congress, but he shares Thompson’s belief that the
theory is more broadly applicable.41
The task of applying institutional corruption theory beyond its origi-
nal legislative context brings to the fore a challenge that largely hiber-
nated so long as the theory remained on its native turf: articulating
criteria for institutional purpose identification.  Richard L. Hasen frames
this ambiguity in terms of the identity of the person or persons whose
goals for the institution properly determine its institutional purpose:
“[A]n institution is in a state of corruption when there is a gap between
developed dependence and dependence desired—but the definition does
not tell us who must desire a particular type of dependence.”42  In the
legislative context, the answer—at least in its most abstract form—seems
obvious: “the people,” united under law, are the agent that determines the
purpose of Congress.  Different democratic theories may tell slightly dif-
ferent stories about the way in which the people’s purpose must be Con-
gress’ purpose, and they may tell substantially different stories about
what more specifically that purpose is and how it should be pursued.
However, these differences are merely further specifications of the same,
shared concept of “institutional purpose,” which can roughly be articu-
lated as: the purpose for which the institution’s activities must be con-
ducted in order to avoid wronging others. This kind of purpose can be
called an “obligatory purpose.”  Because legislators coerce the people
through laws, their activities wrong the people unless they act for the
people’s purpose.  This is why the people’s purpose should guide the
analysis.
plication of the idea, as will be indicated below.)  We should recognize that it is still
individuals who are the agents of institutional corruption and individuals who are to be held
accountable for it.”).
39 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at xiii.
40 Thompson, supra note 31, at 6.
41 See Lawrence Lessig, “Institutional Corruption” Defined, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
553, 555 (2013) (“My hope is that this collection might inspire a similar examination else-
where.  For however familiar are the views of some that the pharmaceutical industry’s influ-
ence on medical practice and public health is an example of institutional corruption, I am
convinced there are many other examples even more significant to the public good.”).
42 Hasen, supra note 23, at 309.
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By contrast, applying this same concept of “institutional purpose”
(i.e. the same criteria for institutional purpose identification) in many
private sector contexts seems impossible, because many organizations do
not have obligatory purposes.  Indeed, many of them seem to engage in
activities that do not wrong anyone if undertaken for any of an infinite
variety of purposes. For example, an organization called “Patti’s Piping
Pies” might bake pies for profit, for charity, for fun, out of habit, for
individuals, for grocery stores, for soldiers and sailors, or it might alter-
nate between these purposes without pie-baking becoming wrongful.  In-
deed, without knowing more, it also seems that Patti’s Piping Pies could
redirect its institutional efforts from pie-baking to cake-baking or candle-
stick-making without wronging anyone.
There are two different ways in which institutional corruption theo-
rists might respond to this challenge.  The first alternative (and the one
that this Article will ultimately endorse) is to acknowledge that institu-
tional corruption theory is inapplicable to institutions that do not have an
obligatory purpose—a purpose for which the institution’s activities must
be conducted in order to avoid wronging others.  Lessig gestures at this
possibility when he writes, “[T]he definition [of “institutional corrup-
tion”] does not purport to specify the institution’s purpose or even to
presume that any particular institution has a purpose.  If an institution
does not have a purpose, then it cannot be corrupted in this sense.”43  It is
implausible that any institution lacks a “purpose” on any understanding
of that term.  Surely, for any institution, there is someone for whom its
activities are useful, or someone who has subjective goals for the institu-
tion or subjective beliefs about what the institution “is for.”  But Lessig
is correct that, on some possible criteria for institutional purpose identifi-
cation, not all institutions will have one.  This appears to be true of the
“obligatory purpose” criteria that I have proposed: the purpose for which
the institution’s activities must be conducted in order to avoid wronging
others.  If my proposed criteria are the correct means of identifying insti-
tutional purposes in the context of institutional corruption analyses, then
only some institutions will have a “purpose” in the relevant sense, and
other institutions will not be candidates for institutional corruption
analysis.
The second alternative is to adopt different criteria for institutional
purpose identification, and therefore a different concept of “institutional
purpose.”  Selecting an alternative to the “obligatory purpose” criteria
would require choosing from among a wide array of possible options.
Does an institution’s purpose depend on the subjective goals of its own-
ers, its managers, its employees, political actors, or society at large?
43 See Lessig, supra note 41, at 554.
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Does it depend on a “meeting of the minds” on the part of some or all of
these?  Does an institution’s purpose depend on its moral obligations, its
public claims, widespread perceptions about its purpose, or its usefulness
to others?  Is an institution’s purpose determined by someone’s ultimate
goal with respect to the organization, or might the means chosen to pur-
sue an ultimate goal sometimes be determinative?
Clarity on this point is important, because the criteria adopted for
institutional purpose identification will determine the result of any insti-
tutional corruption analysis.  For example, Noel may start a business for
the purpose of selling Christmas trees in order to earn money, which she
plans to use to feed her children.  One could plausibly claim that Noel’s
business exists for at least three different purposes: Christmas tree sales,
earning money, and feeding her children.  In this simple example, sup-
pose that feeding her children is the only purpose that Noel actually cares
about, and she sells Christmas trees and earns money only because she
believes that these activities are the most efficient means to her end.
In order to determine whether an influence operating within or upon
Noel’s small business is weakening its effectiveness, it would be neces-
sary to decide which of its purposes should be treated as “true north”—
the baseline from which to measure any deviation.44  If “making money”
is the baseline, Noel’s organization may not be corrupted by a rich cus-
tomer who offers her a lucrative contract to bake so many Christmas
cookies that she will have little time to sell Christmas trees.  On the other
hand, if “selling Christmas trees” is the baseline, the rich customer may
indeed be exerting a corrupting influence.
Institutions may also have multiple purposes that are not linked to-
gether, as Noel’s are, in chains of means and ends.  In cases of non-
linkage, two or more purposes are to some extent in competition for in-
stitutional resources. For example, most universities are widely consid-
ered to have at least two purposes: education and research.  A university
like Harvard might plausibly argue that some amount of research makes
its educational efforts more effective, and also that some amount of
teaching makes its research activities more effective, but it is very im-
plausible that these claims are true of the last marginal hour actually
expended by its faculty either on teaching or on research.  In such cases
(assuming we are unwilling conclude either that a university is a research
institution corrupted by students or that it is an educational institution
with a regrettable research problem), any institutional corruption analysis
must adopt some theory about how resources ought to be allocated be-
44 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 19.
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tween an institution’s multiple independent purposes before it is possible
to determine whether or not it has become institutionally corrupt. 45
A further complication, as ethicist Jonathan Marks observes, is that
on some understandings of what “institutional purpose” means, institu-
tional purposes may change over time.46  For example, Goldman Sachs
famously transformed itself from a partnership into a publicly held cor-
poration.47  Some of Goldman’s partners perceived that transformation to
be a corruption of the firm, while others saw it as the adoption of a new
business purpose: creating value for shareholders.  To distinguish
changes in institutional purpose from institutional corruption, there must
be some way of determining when prior institutional purposes should
remain the analytical baseline, and when institutional corruption re-
searchers should disregard old purposes in favor of new ones.
Thompson has written that institutional corruption is the result of an
influence that undermines an institution’s purpose only in a very specific
way: by undermining its “legitimate institutional procedures.”48  At first
blush, this emphasis on the means of corruption—the undermining of
legitimate procedures—seems to offer a possible escape from the neces-
sity of formulating criteria for institutional purpose identification.  This
hope proves illusory, however, as “Institutional procedures should not be
considered legitimate just because they happen to be in place even if they
are widely accepted.  They are legitimate only if they are necessary to
protect the institution against interests that would undermine its effec-
tiveness in pursuing its primary purposes.”49
In order to determine which procedures are legitimate and which are
not, therefore, we must return to the problem of identifying an institu-
tional purpose or purposes.  Otherwise, we have no way of knowing
whether or not any procedures being undermined are “legitimate” proce-
dures, and thus no way of knowing whether or not an institution is insti-
tutionally corrupt.
45 See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 237–38 (2002) (“[A]ny organization must have a
single valued objective as a precursor to purposeful or rational behavior. . . .  It is logically
impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at the same time.”).  This does not mean,
of course, that an organization cannot pursue multiple purposes, so long as the organization
adopts some function that combines these purposes by prioritizing them, for example, or by
giving them relative weights.
46 See Jonathan Marks, What’s the Big Deal?: The Ethics of Public-Private Partnerships
Related to Food and Health 11 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics, Working Paper No. 11,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2268079.
47 The End of an Era for Goldman, CNN, (May 3, 1999, 7:28 PM), http://money.cnn.
com/1999/05/03/markets/goldman/.
48 Thompson, supra note 31, at 5.
49 Id.
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For example, suppose that a pharmaceutical company named Profit-
able Pills has established complex, highly specific procedures for decid-
ing which research and development efforts it will undertake.  This
process is designed to focus institutional resources on the most poten-
tially profitable products regardless of medical importance.  As a result
of this process, Profitable Pills is exclusively engaged in the develop-
ment and sale of aesthetic treatments, such as hair-loss remedies and
wrinkle reducers.
Next, suppose that the American Heart Association has learned that
the vice president for R&D at Profitable Pills has a weakness for attrac-
tive young representatives.  The American Heart Association sends a
string of attractive young representatives to Profitable Pills in order to
lobby the company to direct funds to the development of important new
heart disease medications.  Perhaps unconsciously, the vice president re-
sponds to these efforts by encouraging some sloppiness among staff
members who apply the company’s rigorous standards to research and
development proposals for heart disease medications.  As a result, heart
disease medications become an additional line of business for Profitable
Pills, even though they would be excluded under a rigorous and impartial
application of the company’s profit maximizing procedures for selecting
R&D projects.
Has the American Heart Association institutionally corrupted Profit-
able Pills?  The answer depends on whether or not the company’s R&D
procedures are “legitimate,” which in turn depends on what serves as the
company’s “institutional purpose.”  The company has indeed been cor-
rupted if its purpose is “making money.”  It has not been corrupted if its
purpose is “developing new drugs,” and it has certainly not been cor-
rupted if its purpose is “improving health.”  If Profitable Pills should be
understood to have two or more institutional purposes, then we must also
know how these purposes should be weighted against each other in order
to know whether its R&D procedures are legitimate.
Thompson offers in passing: “In medical institutions, for example,
the purposes include conducting trustworthy research, providing effec-
tive patient care and protecting the public health.”50  These seem like
plausible purposes for at least some of what we think of as “medical
institutions” according to a variety of different plausible criteria for iden-
tifying institutional purposes.  But because Thompson does not say what
criteria he uses to arrive at this set of purposes, it is hard to know
whether or on what basis he might intend to impute such purposes to a
company like Profitable Pills, which has procedures that ensure it does
nothing on balance to protect public health.
50 Id.
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Thompson offers a second judgment about institutional purposes,
this time about corporations: “In the case of a corporation, the ‘institu-
tional purpose’ refers primarily to the interests of stakeholders, and in
that sense is usually regarded as private.”51  But Thompson does not ar-
ticulate the criteria by which he arrives at this conclusion about corpora-
tions.  Is a corporation’s purpose determined by its legal obligations?  Is
Thompson making an empirical claim that stakeholders generally deter-
mine the actual activities of a firm?  Or does Thompson think that moral
considerations make it the case that stakeholders’ purposes ought to be
considered firm purposes?
Thompson also writes:
The procedures in many public or quasi-public institu-
tions must satisfy some of the same requirements we im-
pose on government, such as transparency and
accountability, but the degree and extent of the require-
ments vary with the purposes of the institution.  For ex-
ample, in medical institutions transparency may be
limited in order to protect patient confidentiality; ac-
countability may be owed to other professionals and the
governing board rather than directly to the public.  Medi-
cal institutions, like others that rely on professional ex-
pertise (including universities), are not properly
governed by a full-blown democratic process, but insofar
as they can be considered public institutions, they should
be at least indirectly accountable to public authorities.52
Thompson is here offering examples of institutional procedures that he
believes are legitimate, and we know that what makes it the case that
procedures are legitimate is that they “are necessary to protect the institu-
tion against interests that would undermine its effectiveness in pursuing
its primary purposes.”53  But because Thompson has specified no criteria
for institutional purpose identification, it is not possible to evaluate his
judgments regarding institutional purposes, and therefore it is also not
possible to evaluate his judgments about the legitimacy of specific
procedures.
Lessig writes that institutional corruption theory “does not purport
to specify the institution’s purpose.”54  This seems wise.  The application
of any theory to any set of facts requires the exercise of what Immanuel
Kant called “judgment,” and reasonable disagreements on matters of
51 Id. at 5 n.5.
52 Id. at 6.
53 Id. at 5.
54 Lessig, supra note 41, at 554.
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judgment will always exist at the margin.55  Because no theory can defin-
itively attribute specific purposes to specific institutions, no theory
should purport to do so.
However, a theory must specify criteria for the application of its key
features, or its key features will merely be ambiguous terms—rhetoric—
instead of concepts.  This is not a trivial semantic point.  The point is not
that the term “institutional purpose” must mean X, or that it cannot mean
Y.  The point is that these words must mean something insofar as they
refer to an essential feature of institutional corruption theory’s analytical
framework.  Philosopher Mark Criley describes a concept as “a cluster of
norms that provide standards for the correct classification of objects” as
instances of that concept.56  In other words, not only must concepts have
criteria for their proper application, concepts consist of criteria for their
proper application.  And any theory worthy of recognition as such must
be built out of concepts, not mere words.
The current lack of widely understood criteria for institutional pur-
pose identification has confused institutional corruption researchers.
Journalist Gregg Fields compared institutional corruption to pornogra-
phy, because it supposedly lacks defining features, but we “know it when
[we] see it.”57  Some scholars have attempted to sidestep institutional
corruption theory’s apparent indeterminacy by stipulating their own defi-
nitions of “institutional corruption” for use in individual projects.58
These stipulations sometimes specify “institutional corruption” in mutu-
ally inconsistent ways.
For example, sociologist Garry C. Gray focuses specifically on the
independence of professionals: “Institutional corruption involves influ-
ences that implicitly or purposively serve to distort the independence of a
professional in a position of trust . . . institutional corruption broadens
55 Kant writes, “To show generally how one ought to subsume under these rules, i.e.,
distinguish whether something stands under them or not, this could not happen except once
again through a rule.  But just because this is a rule, it would demand another instruction for
the power of judgment, and so it becomes clear that although the understanding is certainly
capable of being instructed and equipped through rules, the power of judgment is a special
talent that cannot be taught but only practiced.” IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
268 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1781).
56 Criley, supra note 28, at 50.
57 Gregg Fields, What Institutional Corruption Shares With Obscenity 4 (Edmond J. Sa-
fra Ctr. For Ethics, Working Paper No. 6, 2013) (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2252033.
58 Michael Pierce has observed, “Institutional corruption . . . is an important and valuable
concept.  But its precise definitions (and there are many) are either too complicated or too
susceptible to divisive normative judgments for would-be institution reformers to effectively
employ.” Michael Pierce, Divided Loyalties: Using Fiduciary Law to Show Institutional Cor-
ruption 5 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics, Working Paper No. 19, 2013), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2313321.
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the scope of white-collar criminological theory to include unethical prac-
tices by professionals.”59  By contrast, Marks offers an account that fo-
cuses on loss of institutional trust or trustworthiness regardless of the
presence or absence of professional discretion or individually unethical
conduct: “Although there is some debate about the definition of institu-
tional corruption, I use the term here to identify concerns about wide-
spread or systemic practices that undermine the integrity and/or
trustworthiness of an institution, and/or trust and confidence in that
institution.”60
While unilateral stipulations about the meaning of “institutional cor-
ruption” can smooth the way for specific projects, they alone cannot fos-
ter a mutual understanding of the shared subject matter, if any, that the
efforts of these individual researchers address.  If institutional corruption
theory is to identify a distinct phenomenon—if “institutional corruption”
is to mean anything specific—then researchers must have the benefit of
some criteria for the critical task of institutional purpose identification.
Only a meeting of the minds on this point will make it possible, even in
principle, for researchers to identify relevantly similar states of affairs in
different institutions.  Criteria for institutional purpose identification will
enable institutional corruption researchers to say that they are all study-
ing the same phenomenon.  Otherwise, they will merely be using the
same ambiguous words to describe a variety of different phenomena.
II. RECENT “INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION” RESEARCH
A stream of recent research has taken up the challenge of applying
the institutional corruption framework to private organizations such as
investment consulting firms,61 ratings agencies,62 investment banks,63
think tanks,64 and even whole professions, such as psychiatric
medicine.65  A literature review indicates that institutional corruption re-
searchers have identified at least four distinct phenomena as private-sec-
59 Garry C. Gray, Insider Accounts of Institutional Corruption Examining the Social Or-
ganization of Unethical Behaviour, 53 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 533 (2013).
60 Marks, supra note 46, at 7.
61 See generally Jay Youngdahl, Investment Consultants and Institutional Corruption
(Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics, Working Paper No. 7, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2255669.
62 See id. at 17–18.
63 See generally Malcolm S. Salter, Short-Termism at Its Worst: How Short-Termism
Invites Corruption. . . and What to Do About It (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics, Working
Paper No. 5, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247545.
64 See Brooke Williams, Influence Incognito 6 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics, Work-
ing Paper No. 3, 2013)., available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2239839.
65 See Lisa Cosgrove & Robert Whitaker, Finding Solutions to Institutional Corruption:
Lessons from Cognitive Dissonance Theory 3 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics, Working Pa-
per No. 9, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2261375.
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tor “institutional corruption,” corresponding to different implicit sets of
criteria for identifying an institution’s purpose in the context of an insti-
tutional corruption analysis.  The institutions belonging to these four cat-
egories can be nicknamed “Fiduciaries,” “Frauds,” “Fiends,” and
“Fools.”  Attending to the distinctive features of states of affairs that
qualify institutions to be members of each category may inform our
search for general criteria for institutional purpose identification, and
may also establish clearer limits on the range of application of the theory.
A. Fiduciaries
Researchers have identified the institutions in this category as cor-
rupt because their incentive structures have caused them to violate fiduci-
ary duties owed to others.  “Fiduciary” is a legal term of art for a person
or organization that acts on behalf of a “principal” by exercising discre-
tion with respect to property or some other “critical resource” belonging
to that principal.66  When managing a principal’s resource, a fiduciary is
obligated to act solely to advance that principal’s purposes.67  Larry E.
Ribstein has characterized fiduciary duty as “a duty of selflessness,” be-
cause none of a fiduciary’s purposes may permissibly affect that fiduci-
ary’s management of its principal’s affairs.68  Relationships between
lawyers and their clients, trustees and their beneficiaries, guardians and
their wards, and managers and their company’s shareholders are tradi-
tionally considered fiduciary in nature.69
All fiduciaries are agents for their principals in the sense that they
act on behalf of those principals.  However, not everyone who acts on
behalf of another qualifies as a fiduciary, because discretion is also a
prerequisite for fiduciary status.70  For example, ordinary employees are
agents of the firms for which they work in the sense that they execute
their managers’ instructions, but they are not fiduciaries if they lack dis-
cretion over the management of a critical resource that belongs to the
firm.71  Workers who spend too much time gossiping by the water cooler
66 See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1402, 1404 (2002).  Smith’s theory uses “beneficiary” broadly to refer to the party
on who’s behalf the fiduciary acts. Compare id. at 1400 (listing examples of the relationships
the duty is imposed on, including the distinct trustee-beneficiary relationship), with id. at 1402.
This Article uses principal except when referring to the economic usage of principal-agent.
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
68 Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 904 (2011).
69 See Smith, supra note 66, at 1400. R
70 See Ribstein, supra note 68,  at 902–03.
71 See Smith, supra note 66, at 1403 (“[T]o say that a fiduciary exercises discretion R
implies something more than having mere access to critical resources [belonging to the princi-
pal].  This admittedly fine distinction helps to differentiate fiduciaries and service providers,
such as electricians or mechanics.”).
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manifest what economists call a “principal-agent problem,” but they are
not breaching a fiduciary duty.
A fiduciary relationship differs from a merely contractual relation-
ship.  Both parties to an ordinary business transaction may maximize
their own advantage subject only to contractual obligations that inform a
duty of good faith and fair dealing.72  By contrast, a fiduciary must act
solely to advance its principal’s interests because that fiduciary under-
takes ongoing control over its principal’s resource—be it money, prop-
erty, confidential information, or legal rights73—on condition that the
fiduciary manages that resource on the principal’s behalf. 74  Arthur B.
Laby persuasively characterizes a fiduciary duty in Kantian terms as a
duty to adopt a principal’s ends with respect to the use of that principal’s
resources.75  Various institutions have been identified as corrupt by insti-
tutional corruption researchers on the basis that they have breached a
fiduciary duty.
Jay Youngdahl diagnoses widespread institutional corruption among
investment consulting firms, which provide ongoing strategic advice to
the trustees of retirement funds for the purpose of achieving “sufficient
and sustainable investment returns.”76  Youngdahl argues, consistently
with some language in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act,77 that investment consultants are fiduciaries, and
are therefore obligated to advise their clients solely for their clients’ ben-
efit.78  Nonetheless, he reports, “the industry is riddled with conflicts” of
interest79 that consultants do not consistently disclose to clients.80  For
example, money managers often pay investment consultants large fees in
return for the opportunity to pitch the consultants’ clients.81  A fiduciary
72 See Ribstein, supra note 68, at 909 (“The implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing . . . [is] a duty that all contracting parties have and whose content is derived from the
parties’ agreement.  This is less a separate duty than an approach to interpreting contracts.  In
contrast to fiduciary duties, the implied covenant enables contracting parties to act selfishly as
long as this conduct is at least broadly consistent with the parties’ ex ante expectations based
on the contract.”).
73 See Smith, supra note 66, at 1404. R
74 See Ribstein, supra note 68, at 902, 904.
75 See Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L.
REV. 99, 129 (2008) (noting the duty entails “a commitment by the fiduciary to adopt the
principal’s objectives, goals, or ends as the fiduciary’s own and to promote those ends.”).
76 See Youngdahl, supra note 61, at 8, 14.
77 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(g) (2012).
78 See Youngdahl, supra note 61, at 18–19. But see Ribstein, supra note 68, at 916–17
(maintaining that investment advisors should not be considered fiduciaries, and also that
Dodd-Frank does not establish a true fiduciary standard despite Congress’ inclusion of the
term).
79 Youngdahl, supra note 61, at 9 (quoting Janice Revell, Are Your Savings Safe? The
Seamy Side of Pension Funds, FORTUNE, Aug. 12, 2002, at 105).
80 See id. at 38–40.
81 See id.
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is theoretically forbidden from using its discretionary authority with re-
spect to the principal’s affairs to enrich itself without that principal’s
explicit consent.82  Youngdahl reports that this expectation is largely ig-
nored in an industry characterized by “ferocious sales competition.”83
He concludes that widespread conflicts of interest, as well as a sales-
oriented rather than professional culture,84 have weakened the effective-
ness with which investment-consulting firms pursue their client’s goals.
If investment consultants are doing their jobs poorly, why do retire-
ment funds continue to employ them?  Youngdahl argues that investment
consultants often corrupt the retirement funds themselves by influencing
fund trustees in ways that weaken the effectiveness with which the funds
pursue the purposes of their beneficiaries.  Fund trustees have a fiduciary
obligation to exercise their authority solely on behalf of beneficiaries.85
However, because they are usually unpaid volunteers, they are often re-
ceptive to tokens of appreciation for their hard work.86  Youngdahl re-
ports that investment consultants and money managers have responded to
this natural receptiveness by developing “a sophisticated ‘educational’
industry” to provide trustees with all expenses paid trips to exotic travel
destinations.87  Youngdahl warns that such generous perks blunt trustees’
motivation to second-guess their consultants and venders.  “[S]uch ex-
quisite conferences,” he concludes, “make trustees unlikely to wish to
rock the boat, or to challenge their financial professionals.”88
Senior managers of publicly traded firms have a fiduciary duty to
protect and increase the long-term value of their firm on behalf of its
shareholders.89  Yet, Harvard Business School professor Malcolm S.
Salter has suggested that the widespread practice of linking executive
compensation to short-term stock performance has systematically influ-
enced the management structures of many financial firms in ways that
favor short-term stock performance at the expense of long-term value.90
Salter describes the management practices of various Savings and Loan
institutions during the Savings and Loan (“S&L”) crisis of the 1980’s as
paradigmatic examples of fiduciary breach because management system-
atically squandered firm resources for short-term, high-risk gains.91  Ex-
perts on the S&L crisis have “characterized the gaping disparity between
82 Ribstein, supra note 68, at 904.
83 See Youngdahl, supra note 61, at 42.
84 Id. at 16 (“Much of the investment business, including that of investment consultants,
is premised on an economic model of sales.”).
85 Ribstein, supra note 68, at 901.
86 Youngdahl, supra note 61, at 43.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 44.
89 Ribstein, supra note 68, at 901.
90 Salter, supra note 63, at 20–21.
91 Id. at 21.
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what bank owners and executives captured over the short-term and the
losses they created as ‘looting.’”92
B. Frauds
This category is composed of institutions that have been identified
as institutionally corrupt because, researchers have concluded, their in-
centive structures have caused them to engage in fraudulent, exploitative,
or at least disingenuous business practices in the context of non-fiduciary
business relationships with employees, customers, or consumers.  With
the caveat that not all of these organizations are alleged to have violated
the law, they are called “Frauds.”
Salter identified Citigroup as institutionally corrupt, in part because
its economy of influence—including compensation schemes that tied bo-
nuses to short-term stock performance—led the company to engage in
deceptive marketing practices.93  Citigroup created a “mind-numbingly
complex, high-risk investment fund” comprised of credit default swaps
that were tied to the fortunes of holders of subprime residential mortgage
debt.94  Citigroup’s marketing materials to commercial customers repre-
sented the firm’s role as that of neutral go-between, when in fact it had
“exercised significant influence” over the composition of the fund, in
which it took an undisclosed short position.95  Citigroup did warn inves-
tors in general terms that it might take a short position in the fund, and
the firm’s actions were probably not illegal.96  Nonetheless, Salter con-
cluded, “Citigroup’s negligent behavior was clearly unethical, if not
fraudulent: the disclosures obfuscated the truth, gamed existing SEC and
industry rules pertaining to disclosing conflicts of interests, violated
norms of fairness, and caused substantial injury to poorly informed and
unsuspecting investors.”97
Garry C. Gray,98 law professor Mark A. Rodwin,99 and sociologist
Donald W. Light100 have identified at least some pharmaceutical compa-
nies as members of this category of institutional wrongdoers.  According
to one pharmaceutical industry whistleblower, Gray reports, many sup-
92 Id. (citing George A. Akerlof et al., Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bank-
ruptcy for Profit, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, no. 2 1993).
93 Salter, supra note 63, at 7.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 8–9.
97 Id. at 9.
98 See Gray, supra note 59, at 537–38.
99 See generally Mark A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and
Pharma: An Agenda for Reform, 40 J.L MED. & ETHICS 511 (2012).
100 See Donald W. Light, Strengthening the Theory of Institutional Corruptions: Broaden-
ing, Clarifying, and Measuring 3–4 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics, Working Paper No. 2,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236391.
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posedly scientific studies examining the safety and efficacy of drugs al-
ready on the market have “more marketing than science behind them.”101
Scientists who directed such studies have sometimes “resorted to ‘play-
ing’ with the data that had originally failed to show the expected result,”
and then omitting their initial negative results from their publications. 102
This pattern of behavior may cause a pharmaceutical company to provide
systematically misleading information to physicians and end consumers
about the safety and efficacy profiles of its drugs.  Light likewise identi-
fies some pharmaceutical companies as institutionally corrupt on the ba-
sis that their research practices “result in distorted medical knowledge”
about the drugs they sell.103
Youngdahl offers that independent ratings agencies, such as Stan-
dard & Poor’s (“S&P”), may be institutionally corrupt insofar as they
make misleading claims about providing unbiased evaluations of finan-
cial products.104  Ratings agencies operate under a conflict of interest,
since the firms they rate pay for the rating process, and Youngdahl sug-
gests that such conflicts have led ratings agencies to offer intentionally
misleading ratings. 105  A civil complaint filed by the U.S. Department of
Justice and several states alleges that S&P, in particular, deliberately un-
derstated the market risks associated with some financial products it
rated in order to preserve and increase its sales.106  Nonetheless,
Youngdahl argues, S&P inaccurately marketed its advice to the public as
“objective, independent, and free from conflict of interest.”107
Similarly, journalist Brooke Williams has suggested that some think
tanks are institutionally corrupt insofar as they mislead consumers about
the degree to which their public policy research is independent of special
interests.108  While think tanks hold themselves out to be “dedicated to
independent, innovative research that benefits society as a whole,”109
Williams argues, some of them are in fact “attempting to shape public
policy on behalf of [the] private interests”110 of undisclosed corporate
sponsors by subtly biasing their research “in favor of [sponsor’s] bottom
lines.”111
101 Gray, supra note 59, at 537.
102 Id.
103 Light, supra note 100, at 3.
104 Youngdahl, supra note 61, at 17.
105 Id. at 18.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Williams, supra note 64, at 14.
109 Id. at 6.
110 Id. at 14.
111 Id. at 3.
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C. Fiends
Institutions in this category are not necessarily mistreating their cus-
tomers or clients.  Indeed, their customers and clients may benefit from
their business practices.  However, institutional corruption researchers
have identified them as “institutionally corrupt” because, these research-
ers conclude, their incentive structures have given rise to an institutional
tendency to damage or recklessly endanger the security of the general
public.  These institutions are collectively called “Fiends.”
Fields suggests that the availability of FDIC insurance and the fed-
eral government’s propensity to bail out financial institutions deemed
“too big to fail” jointly influenced banks to become institutionally cor-
rupt.  Fields deems large financial institutions corrupt if they responded
to these artificial incentives by making reckless market decisions in pur-
suit of short-term profits, secure in the knowledge that taxpayers would
foot the bill for any enormous losses.112  One result of these reckless
decisions, Fields writes, was “the mortgage meltdown that ushered in the
worst economic collapse since the Great Depression.”113
Salter argues that firms are institutionally corrupt insofar as they
engage in what he calls “the rule-making game”—the activity of influ-
encing legislation in ways that undermine the law’s suitability for achiev-
ing legitimate state objectives.114  For example, Salter reports that the
financial industry successfully lobbied for a variety of technical exemp-
tions to the so-called Volcker rule, a provision in the Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) of 2010, which was in-
tended to prohibit proprietary trading by FDIC-insured banks.115  Such
gaming, Salter writes, “inflicts a social injury when it subverts legislative
intent and weakens the social contract between the capitalist system and
the citizenry.”116
Justin O’Brien cites the conduct of banks caught up in the recent
scandal involving the manipulation of the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR) benchmark as examples of institutional corruption.117
These banks engaged in “systematic false reporting” in order to “increase
the potential profit of the submitting firms or to convey a misleading
112 Gregg Fields, supra note 57, at 6–10.
113 Id. at 5.
114 Salter, supra note 63, at 11.
115 Id. at 14.
116 Id. at 12.
117 See generally Justin O’Brien, Culture Wars: Rate Manipulation, Institutional Corrup-
tion, and the Lost Underpinnings of Market Conduct Regulation 6 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For
Ethics, Working Paper No. 14, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2277172.
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picture of the relative health of the submitting banks.”118  As a result,
O’Brien reports, public confidence in the benchmark, which references
$350 trillion in derivative contracts, has declined.  This lack of confi-
dence threatens the ongoing stability and health of the worldwide finan-
cial system.119
Finally, Light speculates that the Roman Catholic Church and the
Boy Scouts of America might be considered “institutionally corrupt” if
reputational and financial incentives caused them to systematically sup-
press evidence of criminal acts of sexual abuse.120  Worse, by covering
up these crimes, the organizations may have permitted widespread and
systemic abuse to continue, violating a “fundamental moral baseline.”121
Caregivers may have fiduciary responsibilities toward children when
they serve in loco parentis, but violent crimes are wrong regardless of
the presence or absence of any fiduciary duty.  An organization that sys-
temically suppressed evidence of child sexual abuse would fall into the
category of malefactors designated as “Fiends.”
D. Fools
Institutions in this category have not necessarily betrayed, deceived,
or endangered anyone (although many specific institutions have been al-
leged to fall into more than one of these four categories).  Scholars have
suggested that these institutions may be “institutionally corrupt” on the
basis that their incentive structures give rise to faulty business practices
or failed strategies, which weaken their ability to effectively achieve the
shared subjective goals of organizational insiders, despite those insiders’
best efforts.  Such organizations can be called “Fools.”
Lisa Cosgrove and Robert Whitaker describe cognitive behavioral
research suggesting that organizational decision-makers are often sin-
cerely unaware of the ways in which their relationships, financial inter-
ests, and preexisting beliefs can affect their judgment.122  Such decision-
makers may fail to adopt optimal policies addressing these sources of
bias simply because they do not appreciate the way in which various
sources of bias are weakening the effectiveness with which their organi-
zations achieve the goals to which the decision-makers are subjectively
committed.
118 FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 137(April 25,
2013).
119 O’Brien, supra note 117.
120 Light, supra note 100, at 17.
121 Id.
122 See generally Lisa Cosgrove & Robert Whitaker, Finding Solutions to Institutional
Corruption:Lessons from Cognitive Dissonance Theory 5 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics,
Working Paper No. 9, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2261375.
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For example, the editors of a psychiatric journal may subjectively
intend to publish the highest quality research submitted to the journal for
consideration.  However, as they select among the many articles submit-
ted to them for review, their judgment may be impaired by a subcon-
scious bias in favor of the pharmaceutical companies who support the
journal by taking out paid advertisements.123  Such advertisements are
not concealed from the public, nor do the journal editors make less than
their honest best effort to produce a top-flight academic publication.
Yet, Cosgrove and Whitaker suggest, the journal’s policy of accepting
paid advertising could weaken its effectiveness at achieving the purpose
to which its editors are subjectively committed.124
Until recently, it was not uncommon for medical schools to allow
pharmaceutical companies to provide free lunches and dinners to cash-
poor medical residents—young doctors with long prescribing careers
ahead of them—at which lectures touted the benefits of the company’s
drugs.125  Residents were also given small gifts such as pens and text-
books.126  Cosgrove and Whitaker argue that such gifts create a sense of
reciprocity among young doctors.  Moreover, they warn, residents who
develop an optimistic view about the general efficacy of drug treatment
approaches to disease are likely to retain this intellectual predisposition
throughout their careers due to a psychological phenomenon called “con-
firmatory bias.”127  It was not unreasonable for past medical school pres-
idents to conclude that such small perks were harmless in the context of
an educational environment that offered many opportunities for students
and residents to question the claims of pharmaceutical companies in
classroom and clinical settings.  Nonetheless, Cosgrove and Whitaker
muster recent evidence to suggest that, by permitting such practices,
medical schools may have inadvertently weakened the effectiveness with
which they trained doctors to exercise independent medical judgment.
Because membership in the category of Fools depends on a failure
to achieve subjective goals rather than a failure to meet moral or legal
obligations, nothing prevents organizations with essentially nefarious
purposes from being identified as Fools if their faulty incentive structures
prevent them from attaining their evil ends.  In the context of ongoing
discussions about whether institutional corruption theory should be con-
sidered normative or descriptive, Frances Kamm and others have asked
whether a mafia family would be deemed institutionally corrupt if, for
example, its business associates’ custom of providing the gang with large
123 Id. at 9.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 10.
127 Id. at 6 (“Confirmatory bias is the tendency to look for evidence that supports one’s
prior beliefs and hypotheses.”).
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amounts of free alcohol reduced the quality of deliberation at manage-
ment meetings, thus weakening the gang’s ability to effectively accom-
plish its members’ shared subjective goal of profit through coercion.128
If and when criminal gangs are identified as institutionally corrupt for
this kind of reason, they are Fools.
III. THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION
Most recent research that deploys the terminology of institutional
corruption focuses on institutional states of affairs that fall into one or
more of the four broad categories described above.  These categories dif-
fer from one another along several parameters.  A brief review of their
similarities and differences will help frame this inquiry: which if any of
these categories of states of affairs are good candidates for analysis using
institutional corruption theory’s trademark analytical framework?
Institutions belonging to three out of the four above-described cate-
gories were identified as “institutionally corrupt” on the basis that their
conduct wrongs others in some way.  Fiduciaries are alleged to have
breached affirmative obligations to act solely for their principals’ pur-
poses while managing those principals’ resources.  Frauds are said to
have deceived customers or consumers about the nature of the products
they distribute.  Fiends are accused of menacing the public at large.  By
contrast, Fools are identified as corrupt only because they have failed to
efficiently pursue the subjective ends of organizational participants,
whether or not those ends are obligatory, and indeed whether or not those
ends are even morally or legally permissible.  Designation as a “Fool”
indicates a strategic failure rather than any wrongdoing.
Failure to Discretionary
Contract or Meet an Control Over
Status Affirmative Another’s
Category: Wrongdoing? Relationship? Goal? Resource?
Fiduciaries: ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Frauds: ✓ ✓ c c
Fiends: ✓ c c c
Fools: c c ✓ c
Congress: ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Two out of the four above-described categories—Fiduciaries and
Frauds—identify institutions that are alleged to have violated their con-
tract or fiduciary obligations to customers or principals.  By contrast,
Fiends are accused of acts that wrong others even in the absence of any
special relationship.  Fools are not necessarily accused of wronging any-
128 Lessig, supra note 41, at 555 (“Perhaps there is something to learn about the corrup-
tion of auditing by understanding better the corruption of the Mafia.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 27 14-MAY-14 11:17
2014] INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 579
one, but are merely identified as corrupt on the basis that they are failing
to achieve their participants’ subjective goals.
A different pair of categories—Fiduciaries and Fools—includes in-
stitutions that are said to have failed to pursue specific ends.  Fiduciaries
have failed to unswervingly pursue the ends of their principals, while
Fools have failed to effectively pursue participants’ subjective ends.  By
contrast, Frauds and Fiends are better described as having violated nega-
tive side constraints on their conduct: they have deceived or endangered
others in the course of pursuing commercial or social goals that are per-
missible, but not obligatory, when pursued by legal and ethical means.
Of the four categories identified above, only Fiduciaries have under-
taken the management of a critical resource belonging to another party.
It is the Fiduciaries’ discretionary control over others’ resources that
gives rise to their fiduciary duty to manage those resources solely for the
purposes of the principals to whom the resources belong.  Frauds deceive
those with whom they do business, but they do not make arrangements
on behalf of others.  Fiends wrongly endanger or destroy the resources of
others, but they have undertaken no affirmative obligation to manage
those resources for others’ benefit.  Fools squander their own assets, but
they do not necessarily fritter away assets belonging to anyone else.
Significantly, only Fiduciaries share all of the above features with
Congress, the institution that inspired Thompson to develop institutional
corruption theory.  See Figure 2.  Congressional abuses of power wrong
the people because they exercise the people’s authority for private pur-
poses.  Such abuses are unjust even if no individual intentionally brought
them about.  Institutional corruption of Congress is therefore an injustice
that we cannot rightfully endorse, and one that organizational insiders, at
least, have an obligation to attempt to remedy.129  Congress’ actions may
also wrong or otherwise damage the interests of foreign citizens living
overseas, but such wrongs and harms are not contemplated or captured
by the Thompson-Lessig Model.  Rather, the Model captures the distinc-
tive way in which Congressional abuses of power wrong the very people
whose authority Congress claims to exercise.
Institutional corruption in the context of Congress refers to the insti-
tution’s deviation from the purpose for which it is obliged to act in virtue
of its claim to wield the state’s coercive authority.  Congress may adopt a
variety of different means to achieve its public purpose, but Congress
cannot rightfully choose to discard its public purpose in order to pursue
other purposes instead.  Only the Fiduciaries share an analogous obliga-
tion to act solely for an independently determined purpose.  By contrast,
129 Thompson, supra note 31, at 17 (“[J]ust ‘blaming the system’ lets too many individu-
als in the system off the moral hook.  It ignores the need to pin some responsibility for making
changes (or failing to make changes) on some people in the institution.”).
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institutions identified as Frauds, Fiends, and Fools might all pursue a
wide variety of purposes without being considered institutionally corrupt
for that reason.  Frauds, Fiends, and Fools have been deemed institution-
ally corrupt on alternative bases, namely the violation of legal or moral
side constraints or the adoption of poor strategies.
A. Generalizing the Thompson-Lessig Model
It is no mere accident that the Fiduciaries share more characteristics
with Congress than do the Frauds, Fiends, and Fools.  Congress is a Fi-
duciary, entrusted to exercise the people’s legislative authority on their
collective behalf for their shared purposes.  Indeed, Robert G. Natelson
has amassed considerable historical evidence that participants in the
1787 federal constitutional convention explicitly regarded lawmakers as
fiduciaries for the people.130  Natelson and D. Theodore Rave also ob-
serve that influential enlightenment figures such as John Locke presaged
the idea of lawmakers as fiduciaries.  Rave writes:
In his Second Treatise of Civil Government, John Locke
argued that the government with supreme legislative
power stood in a fiduciary relationship to the people.  In
the original social contract, according to Locke, the peo-
ple delegated power to the legislature on the condition
that the power be used only for the “public good of soci-
ety.”  The legislature was “only a fiduciary power to act
for certain ends.”131
The fiduciary character of Congress’ relationship to the people well
explains the prominence often given to the idea of “public trust” by insti-
tutional corruption theorists.  Thompson writes:
The often cited slogan “public office is a public trust”
expresses in a simple form the important idea that public
officials have fiduciary obligations, which in both law
and morality are more demanding than most ordinary
obligations.132
Lessig likewise affords prominence to the idea of trust in his more
general formulation of the institutional corruption theory as “an economy
of influence that weakens the effectiveness of an institution, especially
by weakening public trust of that institution.”133  All fiduciary relation-
ships are relationships of entrustment, in which a principal entrusts the
130 See Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV.
1077, 1083–88 (2004).
131 Rave, supra note 9, at 708–09 (footnotes omitted).
132 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 197 n.9.
133 Lessig, supra note 6, at 3 (emphasis added).
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management of her property or other critical resource to a fiduciary on
condition that the fiduciary manages that property or resource solely for
the principals’ purposes.134
Michael Pierce has observed parallels between fiduciary analysis
and Lessig’s institutional corruption analysis:
The fiduciary concept produces a similar framework to
Lessig’s, in that the exclusive benefit principle provides
a baseline of undivided loyalty, the violation of which
can be framed as a betrayal.135
He therefore suggests that “analogizing”136 to fiduciary duties would be
a helpful “analytical shortcut”137 for institutional corruption researchers.
Pierce is surely right to identify similarities between fiduciary duty
doctrine and institutional corruption theory.  The only flaw in his argu-
ment is that he understates his own case.  The relationship between insti-
tutional corruption and breach of fiduciary duty is not merely one of
striking resemblance or helpful analogy.  Generalizing the component
concepts of the Thompson-Lessig Model reveals it to actually be a model
of organizational fiduciary duty and breach.
Derek Parfit distinguishes between what he calls a “token”—a spe-
cific object, duty, person, or event that occurs in the world, and a
“type”—a concept of possible objects, duties, persons, or events that are
relevantly similar.138  For example, the orange that I am holding in my
hand right now is a token, but the concept of an orange is a type, of
which there are many existing and possible tokens.  With the aid of this
distinction, Figure 2 illustrates that institutional corruption theory has a
quintessentially fiduciary character.
134 Smith, supra note 66, at 1402.
135 Pierce, supra note 58, at 9.
136 Id. at 15.
137 Id. at 3.
138 See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 293–94 (1984).
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Critical
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(proxy measure of IC) Fiduciary’s
Purposes
Discretionary
Control
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FIGURE 2: THE FIDUCIARY INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION MODEL
No substantive changes to either the structure or the conceptual con-
tent of the model were made in order to affect this transition.  The only
change made is the substitution of general conceptual categories
(“types”) for institutions and purposes that were specifically identified
(that is, were “tokens”) in the Thompson-Lessig Model. The token,
“Congress,” has been replaced by a type—“Fiduciary”—of which Con-
gress is a specific example.  The type, “critical resource belonging to the
principal,” has supplanted the token of the people’s legislative authority.
The token, “public purposes,” has been replaced with the relevant type,
“principals’ purposes.”  This generalized model can be called the “Fidu-
ciary Institutional Corruption Model.”
Like the Thompson-Lessig Model, the Fiduciary Institutional Cor-
ruption Model assumes that a fiduciary’s honest mistake is not consid-
ered a breach of fiduciary duty.  Therefore, institutional corruption
cannot be measured by comparing actual performance to some ideal per-
formance.  Instead, as is true in the specific case of Congress, the corrup-
tion of a fiduciary must be assessed by reference to a proxy—the extent
to which influences that are, in Thompson’s words, “clearly irrelevant”
to the principals’ purposes undermine a fiduciary’s effective stewardship
of its principal’s critical resource.139
Also, like the Thompson-Lessig Model, the Fiduciary Institutional
Corruption Model identifies institutional rather than individual corrup-
tion.  Whereas individual corruption depends on the subjective intent of
an individual actor, institutional corruption occurs when an organization
with a fiduciary duty is hampered by incentives that give rise to an “insti-
tutional tendency” to manage its principals’ resources for the private pur-
poses of the fiduciary institution or its individual agents.  As is the case
with institutional corruption in the context of Congress, a private fiduci-
ary institution may in principle breach its duty to act solely for the inter-
139 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 20.
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ests of its principals even if individuals with the organization are not
personally corrupt.
The Fiduciary Institutional Corruption Model neatly answers many
of the difficult questions raised by the challenge of institutional purpose
identification, at least in principle.  Recall that it was not clear which of a
private organization’s many plausible purposes should serve as its insti-
tutional purpose in order to identify institutional corruption.  The Model
stipulates that the relevant concept of “institutional purpose” is identical
to the one this Article originally proposed in the context of Congress: an
obligatory purpose—a “purpose for which the institution’s activities
must be conducted in order to avoid wronging others.”140  Because a
fiduciary manages a principal’s critical resource on that principal’s be-
half, it must do so solely for that principal’s purpose in order to avoid
wrongdoing.  A principal’s purpose therefore serves as a fiduciary insti-
tution’s normative baseline.  Although it may at times be difficult to de-
termine empirically what a principal’s purpose is, the Model at least
clarifies that this is the kind of purpose that institutional corruption anal-
ysis requires.  This is our long-sought set of criteria for institutional pur-
pose identification.
Recall that it was not clear how an institution with multiple inde-
pendent purposes should allocate resources between those purposes in
order to avoid a charge of institutional corruption.  The Model implies
that each principal’s resource must be managed in accordance with that
principal’s purpose.  When a principal has multiple goals—for example,
low risk and high growth in the investing context—the fiduciary and
principal must come to an understanding about how these multiple pur-
poses are weighted in a single function, which the fiduciary can then
strive to maximize.141  An institutional trustee that manages multiple
funds must therefore manage each fund’s resources in accordance with
the purpose of the principal who owns them.  A law firm with multiple
cases must manage each case in accordance with the purpose of the client
it represents in that case.  It is therefore not necessarily accurate to say
that a private sector institutional fiduciary has a single purpose for which
all of its activities must be conducted.  Instead, the fiduciary has a differ-
ent institutional purpose specific to the management of each individual
client’s resources.
Recall that it was not clear how institutional corruption researchers
should distinguish between institutional corruption and a mere change in
institutional purpose.  Although the relevant empirical inquiries may be
difficult, the Model again offers clear theoretical guidance on this ques-
tion: the institutional purpose for which a private fiduciary organization
140 See supra text accompanying notes 42–43.
141 See Jensen, supra note 45, at 248.
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acts changes when and if its principal either changes her purpose or
ceases to entrust the fiduciary organization with the management of her
affairs.  A unilateral change in the purpose for which an organizational
fiduciary manages a principal’s affairs, on the other hand, would be insti-
tutional corruption.
Finally, the Fiduciary Institutional Corruption Model’s accuracy as
a generalization of Thompson’s original theory is demonstrated by the
fact that the two models accord institutional procedures the same role in
any institutional corruption inquiry.  Ordinary commercial actors may
pursue their own self-interest subject to side constraints.  Violations of
side constraints, because they involve the doing of prohibited things, can
be identified directly.  Fiduciaries, on the other hand, are affirmatively
obligated to act solely for their principal’s purposes.  Because honest
misjudgments are not breaches of a fiduciary duty, the degree to which a
fiduciary duty is discharged cannot be measured directly.  Instead, ana-
lysts must look to the proxy of an institutional tendency to advance irrel-
evant purposes as indirect evidence of a fiduciary breach.
This is why conflicts of interest are acceptable among ordinary
commercial actors so long as they are disclosed, but they are prohibited
for fiduciaries in the absence of specific and explicit consent: conflicts,
in the fiduciary context, are a kind of irrelevant purpose.  As Ribstein
explains, “[E]limination of conflicts is necessary [in the fiduciary con-
text] because the parties cannot otherwise identify breaches of duty.”142
It follows that avoiding institutional corruption—now understood as or-
ganizational breach of fiduciary duty—requires establishing institutional
procedures that eliminate conflicts of interest by excluding irrelevant in-
fluences from a fiduciary institution’s decision making processes.  It fol-
lows that institutional corruption is caused by influences that undermine
those institutional procedures.
The foregoing analysis suggests that institutional corruption theory
is actually a theory of organizational fiduciary duty and breach.  In its
generalized form, represented by the Fiduciary Institutional Corruption
Model, Thompson’s theory of institutional corruption is applicable to
public sector institutions and also to a limited range of private sector
institutions that have undertaken fiduciary obligations.  So understood,
institutional corruption theory identifies an important area of study.  Aca-
demic interest in whether and how we ought to attribute moral and legal
responsibility to organizations has increased in a world heavily influ-
enced by organizational activities.143  Institutional corruption theory can
occupy a distinctive niche in this larger field by focusing on organiza-
tional fiduciaries.
142 Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 227.
143 See, e.g., Luban et al., supra note 9.
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In days past, a single lawyer usually represented each individual
client.144  Today, law firms increasingly represent clients by dividing re-
sponsibility for their legal representation among many specialized law-
yers and paralegals. 145  Institutional corruption theory is well suited for
the task of determining whether the incentive structures of large law
firms foster an institutional tendency to manage clients’ cases for firm
purposes rather than for clients’ purposes.  Similarly, financial institu-
tions that serve as trustees may divide responsibility for managing a ben-
eficiary’s fund among multiple organizational actors.146  Institutional
corruption theory is a highly appropriate tool for addressing the question
of whether incentives operating within or upon these financial institu-
tions give rise to an institutional tendency to manage beneficiaries’ re-
sources in a way calculated to profit the institutions themselves or their
employees or agents.
B. Frauds, Fiends, And Fools Are Not Institutionally Corrupt
Importantly, the Fiduciary Institutional Corruption Model demon-
strates the limits of institutional corruption theory even as it extends its
reach.  Frauds, Fiends, and Fools are not appropriate subjects for the ap-
plication of institutional corruption theory if they lack fiduciary duties—
that is, if they are not entrusted to manage property or another critical
resource belonging to a principal in accordance with that principal’s pur-
poses.  A functional analysis shows that the trademark dynamics of the
institutional corruption model are not replicated in these other contexts,
even in theory.
Frauds and Fiends are alleged to have wronged others in the course
of pursuing otherwise permissible, self-interested commercial activities.
Because a non-fiduciary commercial actor is not obligated to act for the
purposes of any other person or organization, its institutional purpose is
not externally determined.  Instead, an institution’s subjective purposes,
however they are understood and ascertained, must guide the analysis.
Because Frauds and Fiends do not manage critical resources belonging to
others, they must be understood to be directing the use of their own re-
sources in ways that impermissibly affect others.  The Frauds and Fields
144 See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4
(1991) (“[A]s late as 1951, sixty percent of the bar practiced alone.”).
145 See id. at 8 (“Many, perhaps most, of the tasks performed in large firms are assigned
to teams.  Teaming not only encourages lawyers to take ethical risks they would not take
individually, but also obscures responsibility, which makes it difficult for both complainants
and disciplinary authorities to determine which lawyers committed a wrongful act.” (footnotes
omitted)).
146 See generally Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investor and The New Corporate Gov-
ernance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1141 (1991) (noting that financial institutions will often have
interests more aligned with managers than shareholders).
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are said to be corrupt, not because they deviate from some obligatory
purpose, but because some of their subjective purposes (e.g. deceiving
customers or endangering the public as means to their ends) are unjust.
Making these substitutions in the Fiduciary Institutional Corruption
Model yields the “Side Constraints Model” shown in Figure 3.
Institution’s
Critical
Resource
in order to
advance
Institution’s
Permissible
Purposes
institutional tendency
(proxy measure of IC) Wrongful
Purposes
Discretionary
ControlInstitution
FIGURE 3: THE SIDE CONSTRAINTS MODEL
Because the trademark dynamics of the Fiduciary Institutional Cor-
ruption Model fail to operate between these new components, the Side
Constraints Model is incoherent.  In the Fiduciary Institutional Corrup-
tion Model, it is not possible to directly observe institutional corruption,
understood as the institution’s improperly weakened effectiveness at
achieving the purposes of a principal.  Instead, institutional corruption is
observed and measured by proxy—the institutional tendency to advance
irrelevant purposes.  Insofar as an institution is systematically advancing
these irrelevant purposes, it cannot be said to be acting solely for its
principals’ purposes.  By contrast, and contrary to the Side Constraints
Model, it is not true that an institutional tendency to advance unjust pur-
poses necessarily reduces an institution’s effectiveness at achieving its
permissible subjective purposes.  Indeed, unjust activities such as deceit,
reckless endangerment, or cover-ups of criminal misconduct can some-
times be effective means to a variety of ends—increasing market share or
bringing about social change, for examples—that are themselves permis-
sible.  The Side Constraints Model does not make sense because the pur-
suit of unjust purposes is not a reliable proxy for weakened institutional
effectiveness.
More importantly, the Side Constraints Model diagnoses the wrong
kind of thing as “institutional corruption.”  In the Side Constraints
Model, the weakened effectiveness with which an institution achieves its
subjective goals is supposedly what makes it the case that it is institution-
ally corrupt.  But from the perspective of public concern, that is not what
has actually gone wrong with the Frauds and Fiends.  The Frauds and
Fiends are problematic because they are wronging others.  The Side Con-
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straints Model implausibly relegates this real problem to the status of a
proxy for the red herring of business efficiency.
Fools have been deemed institutionally corrupt because their faulty
business practices weaken the effectiveness with which these organiza-
tions achieve their participants’ shared subjective goals.  Because they do
not manage critical resources belonging to anyone else, they must be
thought of as managing their own resources.  Because the supposedly
inconsistent purposes that Fools advance are not distinguishable from
mere mistakes (indeed, they are mere mistakes), they can only be very
generally described as “other purposes.”  Making these substitutions in
the Fiduciary Institutional Corruption Model yields the Business Ineffi-
ciency Model depicted in Figure 4.
Institution’s
Critical
Resource
in order to
advance
Institution’s
Purposes
institutional tendency
(proxy measure of IC) Conflicting
Purposes
Discretionary
ControlInstitution
FIGURE 4: THE BUSINESS INEFFICIENCY MODEL
As we saw in the case of the Side Constraints Model, the trademark
dynamics of institutional corruption theory fail to play out between the
component concepts of the Business Inefficiency Model.  Recall that in-
stitutional corruption cannot be observed directly because honest mis-
takes are not evidence of corruption.  For this reason, institutional
corruption theory looks to a proxy—private interests, in the case of the
Thompson-Lessig Model—to determine whether an institutional ten-
dency is improperly weakening the effectiveness with which an organi-
zation achieves its purpose.  Because the Business Inefficiency Model
obliterates the distinction between mistakes and improper purposes, it
does not actually identify a proxy for anything distinct from the kinds of
honest misjudgments that institutional corruption theory denies are evi-
dence of institutional corruption in any other context.
C. Should We All Be Considered Fiduciaries?
The fiduciary obligation to act solely for someone else’s purposes
may appear an uplifting departure from grubby marketplace norms.  In
the famous words of Justice Cardozo: “A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the marketplace.  Not honesty alone, but the
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punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior.”147
Surely, society could only benefit from more honor and sensitivity
in human relations.  Yet, this Article has so far followed Smith in sup-
posing that a fiduciary duty, well-described by Ribstein as a “duty of
selflessness,”148 properly obligates only those individuals and organiza-
tions that have undertaken the management of someone else’s critical
resource on their behalf.149
If violations of the relatively modest standards of the marketplace,
such as those perpetrated by Frauds, or the even lower standards of com-
mon decency, such as those transgressed by Fiends, do not make it the
case that a malefactor is “institutionally corrupt,” then perhaps the prob-
lem is that widely-accepted legal and moral standards for the behavior of
these institutions are too low.  Perhaps the world would be a better place
if more market actors understood themselves to be constrained by fiduci-
ary duties to their customers, or even to the world at large.  The attribu-
tion of fiduciary duties to a wider range of actors could potentially
transform many more instances of organizational malfeasance into tracta-
ble subjects for institutional corruption analysis.  But would an obliga-
tion of “selflessness” in the conduct of ordinary commercial transactions
actually make our society more just or humane?
The question of when and why fiduciary duties should be recog-
nized under law is the subject of a robust jurisprudential literature to
which august private law experts have contributed their wisdom.150  This
Article does not pretend to add substantively to this ongoing debate, and
those who want to familiarize themselves with the high-level discussion
on this issue should consult this literature directly.  Nonetheless, institu-
tional corruption researchers, who may resist the conclusion that institu-
tional corruption theory has a limited range of application, deserve to be
offered a few common-sense considerations against attributing a duty to
exclusively pursue someone else’s purposes to most or all commercial
actors.
147 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
148 Ribstein, supra note 68, at 904.
149 See Smith, supra note 66, at 1402.
150 See, e.g., Matthew Conaglen, A Re-appraisal of the Fiduciary Self-Dealing and Fair-
Dealing Rules, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 366 (2006); Robert  Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The
Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1045 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425 (1993); TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011); Laby,  supra note 75; Rib-
stein, supra note 142; Ribstein, supra note 68; L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69; Smith, supra note 66. For a recent discussion of the possible expansion
of fiduciary obligations in the finance industry, see Kristina A. Fausti, A Fiduciary Duty for
All?, 12 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 183 (2010).
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Because most fiduciary duties are created by contracts that confer
managerial authority over a principal’s property or other critical resource
to a fiduciary, one can begin to assess the desirability of such arrange-
ments by comparing the choices that people frequently choose to turn
over to fiduciaries to choices that are seldom so delegated.  We often
empower fiduciaries to manage our financial affairs, our real estate hold-
ings, our businesses, and our legal rights.  We seldom empower fiducia-
ries to manage our diets, our social calendars, our wardrobes, or our
marital choices.
To generalize from these examples, people often find fiduciaries
helpful when their purposes are fairly stable and can be reasonably well
articulated to an appropriate expert, but when the best means of achiev-
ing those purposes requires making a complicated series of strategic
judgment calls on the basis of specialized information and experience.
People seldom find fiduciaries helpful when the means of achieving their
purposes are straightforward, and when those purposes themselves are
very nuanced or are prone to rapid change.  Few people, in this society at
least, imagine that they can so perfectly explain what they want in a
spouse that they are willing to delegate that decision to someone else.
Many people generally strive to eat healthy food, but few of them invari-
ably resist enjoying a ballpark hot dog or an extra-large serving of rocky
road ice cream.
Occasionally, someone elects to turn over the management of some
part of her life to another person who will not allow her to succumb to
her occasional bouts of akrasia—failure of will.151  Dissertating Deborah
might ask her husband to change the password on the Internet router
before he goes to work.  More formally, Pudgy Paul might deposit his
grocery budget into a trust account every month, from which only his
grocery fiduciary is empowered to withdraw funds for the purpose of
purchasing healthy groceries for Paul.  Moreover, Paul has provided all
local grocers with a signed document requesting that they refuse to sell
him any groceries directly until at least thirty days after he revokes this
request in writing.  Such voluntary arrangements can enhance individu-
als’ abilities to achieve their chosen goals.  But does it follow that all
grocers, or all Internet providers, ought to conceive of themselves as fi-
duciaries for those to whom they sell goods and services?
Fiduciaries manage principals’ affairs in order to advance those
principals’ purposes, but this exercise of discretion is coupled with some
responsibility for the purposes advanced.  A lawyer cannot legally re-
present a client in a frivolous lawsuit, and she may feel morally obligated
to refuse to file a merely spiteful one.  A trustee might refuse to manage
151 For a general overview, see Alfred R. Mele, Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order
Desires, 26 NO ˆUS 281(1992).
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the fund of a beneficiary who insists that money be squandered on objec-
tively hopeless investments recommended by a dissembling religious
leader.  A surgeon might refuse to conduct a surgery that he believes is
unduly risky given that its purpose is to preserve a patient’s athletic abili-
ties rather than her general health or longevity.152
A compunctious fiduciary might try to explain that a purpose she
refuses to promote is not really her client’s purpose in some relevant
sense.  In the fiduciary’s judgment, the objectionable purpose may be
irrational, or it may be inconsistent with other purposes that the fiduciary
believes her client is in some way required to have, such as health or
financial security.  On this sort of theory, a grocer who considered him-
self a fiduciary for his customers might feel obligated to refuse to sell ice
cream to visibly overweight shoppers, sugar cereals to patrons with small
children, or cheap beer to anyone who tries to purchase it more fre-
quently than, in the grocer’s judgment, they should.
That grocers who act like this are exceedingly rare in the market-
place suggests that most people do not want to have this kind of relation-
ship with the person who sells them food.  But if grocers are deemed
“institutionally corrupt” insofar as they fail to police what they (or some
external authority) judge to be their customers’ rational best interests,
tools to address this corruption could be forthcoming in the form of pub-
lic censure or even business regulations that constrain all grocers to act
as though they were fiduciaries with respect to their customers’ diets.  In
the many spheres of life in which people prefer to exercise their own
judgment, however flawed their priorities may appear to some observers,
a broad attribution of fiduciary duties to commercial actors may thus
threaten the exercise of personal choice.
Moreover, attributing fiduciary duties to participants in arms-length
commercial transactions would impede the ability of contractual fiducia-
ries to do their jobs.  Stockbrokers are rightly subject to ordinary com-
mercial side constraints of good faith and fair dealing, but if they adhere
to a fiduciary duty to sell only those products that they judge to be the
best investments for buyers, trustees would be deprived of options that
they might judge best for their clients.  Pharmaceutical companies, like
stockbrokers, owe consumers and prescribing physicians a duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and to meet that obligation they must not misrepre-
sent the drugs that they manufacture and sell.  But if pharmaceutical
companies had a fiduciary duty to sell patients only the drugs that the
companies judged to be optimal for those patients’ conditions, doctors
would be deprived of choices when they exercised their own judgment
152 See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation
of Physicians to “Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services that Are Not
Medically Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 346 (2009).
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concerning a patient’s medical care.  Because expert opinions differ, re-
quiring too many fiduciaries to exercise their honest best judgment on
the same person’s behalf can deprive that person of a result consistent
with anyone’s considered opinion,153 including the person or organiza-
tion she actually entrusted to do the job.
Finally, if corporations were thought to have fiduciary duties to
their counterparts in ordinary commercial transactions, the officers and
directors of those corporations would find themselves hobbled by una-
voidable and intractable conflicts of interest.154  According to traditional
legal doctrine, corporate officers and directors have a fiduciary obliga-
tion to conduct business on behalf of shareholders.155  If this is the case,
then they cannot be simultaneously obligated to conduct business exclu-
sively for the purposes of customers, any more than a lawyer can coher-
ently represent opposing parties in a single lawsuit, or a physician can
simultaneously practice medicine on behalf of her patient and his insur-
ance company.156  One duty would require corporate managers to maxi-
mize profits while the other would require them to sell goods at cost.
Laby explains this conundrum in the context of arms-length financial
transactions: “When acting as a dealer, the firm seeks to buy low and sell
high—precisely what the customer seeks. It is hard to see how any dealer
can act in the ‘best interest’ of his customer when he is trading with
her.”157
To be sure, most commercial transactions (unlike lawsuits) are mu-
tually beneficial, but neither party generally obtains the maximum possi-
ble benefit from any given transaction.  The value created by every
commercial transaction is divided between the parties according to the
result of a mutually self-interested negotiation against the backdrop of
legal rights and market conditions.  In this negotiation, managers are tra-
ditionally thought obligated to represent the interests of firm sharehold-
ers, subject to ordinary legal side constraints of good faith and fair
dealing.  It would not be fair to managers who earnestly strive to dis-
charge all of their obligations to render the achievement of this laudable
goal logically impossible.
153 See generally Bertram L. Levy et al., Problems and Benefits of Multiple Fiduciaries:
An Estate Planning Perspective, 33 MERCER L. REV. 355 (1981) (discussing problems arising
from appointing multiple fiduciaries in the estate planning process).
154 See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW 395 (2010) (discussing conflict of interests arising between financial
managers and customers).
155 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (“Duty of care and
duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavors to act in the service
of a corporation and its stockholders.”).
156 See Alexei M. Marcoux, A Fiduciary Argument Against Stakeholder Theory, 13 BUS.
ETHICS QUARTERLY 1, 11 (2003).
157 See Laby, supra note 154, at 425.
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Fiduciary duties to clients, and therefore institutional corruption, are
certainly compatible with the corporate form, but they depend on the
existence of a chose—a piece of property or other identifiable critical
resource belonging to a principal, over which the fiduciary corporation
exercises discretion.158  A large corporate bank, for example, acts as a
fiduciary for the beneficiaries of trusts that it manages, but it is not obli-
gated to conduct its unrelated business activities for the purposes of those
trustees.  A law firm incorporated as an LLC must manage clients’ legal
rights solely for those clients’ purposes, but the firm can permissibly
make decisions about which cases to take in accordance with the part-
ners’ purpose of earning money.  Analogously, a member of Congress
must exercise the lawmaking power solely for public purposes, but she
can permissibly decide whether or not to run for re-election based on her
own personal considerations, and she can likewise spend her off-hours
pursuing private purposes, so long as she is not pursuing them with pub-
lic resources.
By contrast, attributing fiduciary duties to counterparts in ordinary
commercial transactions would produce conflicts of interest for corporate
officers and directors, because it is the presence of property or another
critical resource belonging to a principal, over which the putative fiduci-
ary exercises control, that defines and limits the sphere of activity to
which fiduciary duties apply.  In an ordinary commercial transaction
there is no such limiting principle, because there is no delegation of con-
trol over an identified resource belonging to a consumer.  Instead, a good
or service is exchanged for a negotiated sum of money, and a consumer’s
legitimate interest in receiving the benefit of such a bargain can be recon-
ciled with shareholders’ interest in maximizing firm value by means of a
legal and moral side constraint of good faith and fair dealing on the part
of the transacting firm.  A corporation that violates such a side constraint
belongs to the category named “Frauds,” but it is not institutionally
corrupt.
Justin O’Brien objects to the traditional understanding of the firm
elucidated above, according to which corporate officers and directors
have fiduciary obligations to shareholders in virtue of the fact that they
manage a firm that is owned by those shareholders.  O’Brien complains
that “the formulation is static, restrictive of application of common law
and equity considerations, and silent on the reality of how political calcu-
lation frames the parameters of obligation in financial services.”159
158 See Marcoux, supra note 156, at 3 (“The fiduciary relation is a triadic relation ex-
isting among and between two parties and some asset or project.”).
159 Justin O’Brien, Singapore Sling: How Coercion May Cure the Hangover in Financial
Benchmark Governance 26 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics, Working Paper No. 29, 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2350445.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 41 14-MAY-14 11:17
2014] INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 593
However, to deny that firms have fiduciary obligations to non-owner
constituencies is not to deny that they have any duties to those constitu-
encies.  On the contrary, firms are generally obligated not to violate the
rights of individuals or communities by endangering others, creating nui-
sances, or encroaching on public or private property without legal per-
mission.  Firms are also obligated, in their dealings with others, to adhere
to ordinary commercial standards of good faith and fair dealing.  These
kinds of obligations are side constraints: finite obligations to refrain from
doing things or to fully honor defined and limited affirmative commit-
ments that were incurred initially for a firm’s benefit.  A fiduciary duty,
by contrast, is the obligatory goal to which a principal’s otherwise unen-
cumbered resources must be devoted by the fiduciary that manages
them.160  To see the difference, consider the example of employee
wages.  Good faith and fair dealing require that all wages due must be
paid on time, but firms are not generally thought obligated to pay their
employees as much as they possibly can, because firms are not generally
considered to be fiduciaries for their employees.  If firms were fiducia-
ries for their employees, then firm managers would suffer from a conflict
of interest, because they are ostensibly already obligated to manage their
firm’s resources on behalf of the shareholders who own it.
Nor is it the case that supposing firms to have fiduciary obligations
to customers or other non-owner constituencies is the only way to em-
brace “the reality of how political calculation frames the parameters of
obligation.”161  Insofar as good relationships with constituencies such as
politicians, customers, and community activists are important to the
long-term prospects of firms—and they usually are—it is perfectly con-
sistent with what Jensen has called “enlightened shareholder theory” to
make investments in good relationships with these constituencies.162
The two primary manifestations of good corporate citizenship are adher-
ing to standards of good faith and fair dealing on one hand, and building
constructive working relationships with those who might either harm or
help a firm’s prospects on the other.  Neither activity is inconsistent with
the traditional fiduciary obligation that corporate managers are thought to
have to shareholders.
This Article argues that institutional corruption theory is a theory of
organizational fiduciary duty and breach as the term “fiduciary” is tradi-
tionally understood in the law.  Nothing in its argument denies that firms
have non-fiduciary obligations to other constituencies, nor does it sug-
gest that corporate cultivation of non-owner constituents is not good bus-
160 See Laby, supra note 75, at 103 (“[T]he irreducible core of the fiduciary relationship is
the fiduciary’s obligation to adopt the principal’s goals, objectives, or ends.”).
161 See id.
162 See Jensen, supra note 45, at 245–46.
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iness.  Instead, it observes that Congress owes the people a fiduciary duty
as that concept is traditionally understood in the law, and that relation-
ships giving rise to fiduciary duties so understood have certain distinctive
features: 1) discretionary management, 2) over property or another criti-
cal resource, 3) belonging to a principal.  Corporate relationships that
have these characteristics are fiduciary relationships.  It makes sense to
conclude that corporations with incentive structures that undermine the
effectiveness with which they meet fiduciary obligations are institution-
ally corrupt, because they, just like Congress, are failing to effectively
pursue an obligatory purpose.  Corporations that violate side constraints
or fail to cultivate good relationships with constituencies that can harm
them may be Frauds, Fiends, or Fools, but it does not make sense to say
that they are “institutionally corrupt” if they do not have an obligatory
purpose to which they must direct the otherwise unencumbered resources
under their control.
CONCLUSION
Thompson developed a useful model of organizational fiduciary
duty and breach that can be applied to some private sector organizations
as well as to public institutions.  However, the very distinctive features
that make the theory useful also make it the case that the theory has
limited application.  “Institutional corruption” cannot simply refer to any
institutional state of affairs to which a researcher objects, or the term will
lose its meaning, and institutional corruption will fail to develop into a
distinctive new research field.
Scholars and journalists have recently pursued a wide variety of in-
teresting and important projects under the rubric of “institutional corrup-
tion.”  Those among them who have focused on institutional Frauds,
Fiends, or Fools have generated new findings and analyses regarding
matters of widespread concern.  These projects, while certainly valuable,
do not address the subject matter of institutional corruption theory if they
do not focus on cases of organizational fiduciary duty and breach.
Some institutional corruption researchers may intend to attribute fi-
duciary duties to commercial actors that have not previously been con-
sidered fiduciaries.  In such cases, researchers should explicitly argue for
any novel claim of fiduciary status instead of treating that claim as the
unexamined assumption of an institutional corruption analysis.  The ro-
bust existing jurisprudential and policy debate about the nature and ad-
visable extent of fiduciary obligations in the law would be enriched by
their direct engagement.
